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Shared parenting – a 70% solution? 
Felicity Kaganas, Senior Lecturer, and Christine Piper, Reader, Department of 
Law, Brunel University 
In the context of increased litigation over contact, this article examines the debate around 
proposals for a presumption of ‘shared parenting’. It concludes that such a presumption would 
not achieve the aims of its proponents. Its introduction would also be fraught with practical 
and doctrinal problems. 
 
n 1987 Michael King1 criticised the Law Commission’s proposals for the reform of the law 
relating to custody and access, the proposals that were subsequently embodied in the concept 
of parental responsibility in the Children Act 1989.2 He argued that custody battles were often 
seen as symbolic contests affirming the parties’ relative fitness as parents and that joint custody 
often amounted to a mechanism used to mollify non-residential parents. The proposed changes 
would likewise, he said, be largely symbolic in nature. They would have limited practical 
significance since courts have no control over future events, orders are subject to extra-legal 
re-negotiation and, in the case of older children who can vote with their feet, the court’s 
pronouncement can be overridden completely. To suggest, as the Law Commissioners did, that 
the law is capable of ‘maintaining beneficial relationships’ is to confuse legal rhetoric with 
social reality.3 While the symbolic recognition of both parents might help to reduce bitterness, 
King said, the law is not capable of changing human behaviour. 
 In fact, the report of the Law Commission in 1988 reveals that the Commissioners were not 
solely preoccupied with the supposed instrumental effects of the law.4 They suggested that 
giving equal status to parents should not only be seen as part of a general aim to encourage 
both to feel ‘concerned and responsible’5 for their children, but also as part of the objective of 
decreasing the incidence of symbolic litigation.6 It was hoped that the incorporation of the 
concept of parental responsibility into the Children Act 1989, together with the ‘no-order’ 
principle, would have the effect of reducing conflict. Because neither parent would lose 
parental rights or status on divorce, there would be less to fight over.7 The persistence of 
parental responsibility, it was thought, might lower the stakes and avoid casting the 
non-resident parent in the role of ‘loser’ who loses all.8 
NEW PRESSURE FOR CHANGE 
Yet the package that the Children Act 1989 offers to parents would appear not to have worked 
to increase parental co-operation and decrease litigation and, once again, dissatisfaction with 
the lot of non-resident parents is being voiced. First, evidence suggests that co-operation in the 
form of joint parenting and joint decision making are far from the norm; indeed, many 
                                                          
 1 ‘Playing the Symbols – Custody and the Law Commission’ [1987] Fam Law 186. 
 2 Family Law, Review of Child Law: Custody, Working Paper No 96 (HMSO, 1986). 
 3 Referring to para 3.7 of the Working Paper (ibid). And further: ‘Here it seems to me, the Commissioners are 
entering a fantasy world in which the courts have the power to ensure the welfare and happiness of all children 
who come before them’ (M. King, op cit, n 1, at p 187).  
 4 Family Law. Review of Child Law. Guardianship and Custody, Law Com No 172 (HMSO, 1988).  
 5 Ibid, at para 2.10. 
 6 Ibid, at paras 2.11 and 4.5. Indeed, the Law Commission stated: ‘we are only too well aware of the limits of the 
law in altering human relationships’, at para 4.5.  
 7 Ibid, at para 4.5. See also J. Roche, ‘The Children Act 1989: Once a Parent Always a Parent?’ (1991) 5 Journal 
of Social Welfare and Family Law 345. Although, in practice, one parent, the resident parent, would be in a better 
position to exercise parental responsibility after separation, both parents, in law, would retain the full range of 
parental duties and powers. 
 8 Op cit, n 4, at para 4.5. 
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non-resident fathers lose contact with their children altogether.9 Secondly, bitterness and 
conflict have apparently not been reduced. Continuously erupting contact disputes – what 
Grant J referred to 20 years ago as ‘perennials’10 – have not been eliminated. On the contrary, 
the volume of disputes has increased.11  
 The law is once again being criticised and reforms debated. Some of the criticism comes 
from campaigning groups such as Families Need Fathers and the Equal Parenting Council, 
groups representing non-resident parents, many of whom express deep feelings of anger and 
betrayal. But concern about contact is reported to be more widespread than this. A recent 
consultation paper prepared by the Children Act Sub-Committee of the Lord Chancellor’s 
Advisory Board on Family Law12 was issued largely, it seems, as a response to concerns noted 
by respondents from diverse disciplines to an earlier consultation paper.13 Those concerns 
related to the perception that court orders did not achieve the objective of facilitating or 
sustaining relationships between children and non-resident parents and also to the difficulties 
involved in enforcement.14 
 Once again, the search is on for mechanisms that will promote agreement, reduce litigation 
and encourage responsible parenting. One of the proposals for change, advocating what is 
termed ‘shared parenting’, rests on the (now familiar) argument that equality of status or rights 
will achieve these aims. It is this proposal that we wish to consider here. 
SHARED PARENTING 
The notion of shared parenting has already come to be seen as potentially useful by some 
academics and practitioners in other jurisdictions where disillusionment about the law 
regulating contact has become apparent. One such jurisdiction is Australia. A new Part VII of 
the Australian Family Law Act 1975, which was introduced in 1996 by the Family Law 
Reform Act 1996, embodies concepts and aims similar to those central to the Children Act 
1989. It ‘too’ emphasises that parenthood survives the end of the parents’ relationship. It ‘too’ 
casts parenthood as an obligation rather than a right and as one that is shared between both 
parents,15 and it ‘too’, according to research into its operation, has provoked discontent among 
non-resident parents. The aim of ensuring that parents would continue to share responsibility 
for raising children after separation and the introduction of a right of contact for children16 
created a situation where non-resident parents, who ‘had been led to expect’ ‘extra 
entitlement’, have been disappointed by the courts.17 The researchers go on to suggest that 
while some parents might find agreement easier under the Act, others regard it as providing a 
new and more powerful armoury to be deployed in a battle over the children. In order to avoid 
                                                          
 9 See B. Simpson, P. McCarthy and J. Walker, Being There: Fathers after Divorce (University of Newcastle upon 
Tyne, Relate Centre for Family Studies, 1995), at chapter 3. See also M. Maclean and J. Eekelaar, The Parental 
Obligation (Hart Publishing, 1997), at p 121. 
 10 Conciliation and Divorce (Barry Rose, 1981). 
 11 R. Bailey-Harris, G. Davis, J. Barron and J. Pearce, Monitoring Private Law Applications Under the Children 
Act: A Research Report to the Nuffield Foundation (University of Bristol, 1998).  
 12 Consultation Paper issued by the Children Act Sub-Committee of the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Board on 
Family Law, Making Contact Work: A Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Facilitation of Arrangements for 
Contact between Children and their Non-residential Parents and the Enforcement of Court Orders for Contact 
(LCD, 2001). 
 13 Ibid, at para 1.3. 
 14 Ibid, at para 1.4. 
 15 J. Dewar and S. Parker with B. Tynan and D. Cooper, Parenting, Planning and Partnership: The impact of the 
new Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975, Family Law Research Unit Working Paper No 3 (Griffith University, 
1999), at p 4. 
 16 See H. Rhoades, ‘The “No Contact Mother”: Reconstructions of Motherhood in the Era of the “New Father”’ 
(2002) 16 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 71, at p 72, referring to Australia, Senate, Family 
Law Reform Bill 1994, Explanatory Memorandum (November 1994), at para 5 and Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), 
s 60B(2)(b), respectively.  
 17 J. Dewar and S. Parker, op cit, n 15. See also, evidence from an official enquiry after 2 years of operation of the 
1996 amendments Child Contact Orders: Enforcement and Penalties (Family Law Council, 1998); H. Rhoades, 
op cit, n 16, at p 72. 
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such battles, some lawyers and mediators use ‘symbolic’ shared residence orders18 to ‘sell’ a 
settlement to the parties. These symbolic orders give liberal ‘parenting time’ – contact – to the 
non-resident parent.19 Their use in cases of conflict, may, the researchers think, constitute 
evidence that they might have settlement-promoting potential in some instances.  
 Shared parenting is being promoted also by those concerned, in several jurisdictions, about 
so-called ‘parental alienation syndrome’ (PAS).20 Mental health experts in the US have 
suggested that ‘time-share’ over extended periods such as alternate weekends and holidays can 
help to repair relationships between children and ‘rejected’ parents. These periods, they say, 
should be set by means of court orders and it should not be in the parents’ power to alter 
them.21  
 In the UK too now, there is an emerging view that greater use of similarly designated court 
orders would be beneficial. The words ‘shared residence orders’ and ‘shared parenting’ are 
being used in some influential quarters in relation to post-separation parenting, with the 
argument being put forward that such arrangements are fairer, good for children and help to 
encourage settlement. For instance, at a recent conference jointly organised by the Family 
Courts Consortium and the Lord Chancellor’s Department (LCD), Hamish Cameron, a 
consultant child psychiatrist, advocated ‘a transparent, easily understood framework’ for shared 
parenting. By this he meant a court-specified presumptive tariff of ‘balanced parenting time’ – 
which might be a 70/30 split – which would be enforced from the first directions appointment 
in section 8 applications.22 Tony Hobbs, a psychologist, recommends a similar measure as a 
means of ‘disarm[ing] the majority of PAS-based legal battles at a stroke’: 
 
‘Following separation, rather than requiring court action for contact between children and 
either parent to be maintained, consideration could be given to developing a satisfactory 
form of legal “default” position, whereby child–parent contact continues to be shared, 
unless there is a valid reason to the contrary.’23  
MAKING CONTACT WORK 
Most significant, however, is the appearance of the debate about ‘shared residence’ or ‘shared 
parenting’ in the report published by the LCD in February 2002, Making Contact Work.24 
                                                          
 18 Op cit, n 15, at p 73. 
 19 This is not, of course, a new suggestion: see, for example, A. Bainham who suggested in 1990 that commentators 
should focus their critical faculties on what, if anything, the Children Act 1989 was doing to promote 
‘time-sharing’ (‘The Privatisation of the Public Interest in Children’ (1990) 53 MLR 206, at p 212).  
 20 H. Rhoades, for example, refers to an Australian case, In the Marriage of Johnson (1997) 22 Fam LR (op cit, 
n 16, at p 74, n 44). See also, a Canadian article by N. Bala, ‘A Report from Canada’s “Gender War Zone”: 
reforming the child-related provisions of the Divorce Act’ (1999) 16 Canadian Journal of Family Law 163. In the 
UK, there is considerable scepticism about the existence of parental alienation syndrome (PAS). It was argued in 
an expert report submitted to the Court of Appeal that PAS does not exist in that it is not generally recognised in 
the area of mental health and that the concept is unhelpful (C. Sturge in consultation with D. Glaser, ‘Contact and 
Domestic Violence – The Experts’ Court Report’ [2000] Fam Law 615). Their view was accepted by the court 
(Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re V (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re M (Contact: Domestic Violence); 
Re H (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2000] 2 FLR 334, per Thorpe LJ). The judgment in a more recent Court of 
Appeal case has been interpreted by one commentator as acknowledging the existence of the syndrome (Re C 
(Prohibition on Further Applications) [2002] 1 FLR 1136 discussed in T. Hobbs, ‘Parental Alienation Syndrome 
and UK Family Courts – The Dilemma’ [2002] Fam Law 381). However, this interpretation is not borne out by 
the words of the judge (see J. Masson ‘Parental Alienation Syndrome’ [2002] Fam Law 568, and C. Williams, 
‘Parental Alienation Syndrome’ [2002] Fam Law 410).  
 21 See M. Sullivan and J. Kelly, ‘Legal and Psychological Management of Cases with an Alienated Child’ (2001) 
39(3) Family Court Review 299, at p 305. 
 22 ‘Sanctions of the Last Resort’ talk given at the ‘Making Contact Work’ conference, 20 November 2001: see, 
now, Conference Report by the Family Courts Consortium, 2002. 
 23 T. Hobbs, ‘Parental Alienation Syndrome and UK Family Courts – The Dilemma’, op cit, n 20, at p 386. 
 24 The Advisory Board on Family Law: Children Act Sub-Committee Making Contact Work: A Report to the Lord 
Chancellor on the Facilitation of Arrangements for Contact Between Children and their Non-residential Parents 
and the Enforcement of Court Orders for Contact (LCD, 2002).  
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Responding to the submissions of Families Need Fathers,25 The Equal Parenting Council and 
the Association for Shared Parenting on this ‘important question’,26 the report endorses the 
objective of ‘full involvement’ on the part of both parents27 and sets out the proposal of the 
three groups aimed at achieving this. The proposal they make is that, in order to counter the 
idea that ‘winner takes all’ and to promote parental involvement by means of the least 
adversarial methods possible, there should be a presumption of shared parenting.28 The 
argument put forward in support of this proposition is that such orders, which would not 
necessarily mean equal division of time, would amount to recognition of the importance of 
both parents and, if they were to become the norm, would ‘set the tone’ for negotiation and 
‘remove obstacles’ to contact. How far it is intended that this presumption would extend is not 
clear from the report; no distinction is made between married and unmarried parents or 
between those with and without parental responsibility. 
 The LCD report makes no recommendations on shared parenting, noting that such ‘radical 
reform’ went beyond the scope of its remit.29 It also evinces some scepticism about the benefits 
of a move towards shared parenting, observing that ‘substantial investigation and validation’ 
would be required first. Financial constraints and distance might make shared parenting 
impractical; parents might not be able to afford two homes ‘with suitable child facilities and 
within easy travelling distance of each other’.30 In addition, one parent might need protection 
from the other, as might the child.31 Finally, the report states that ‘while we understand the 
argument that an expectation of shared parenting as the norm should restrict the scope for 
acrimonious disagreement, we doubt its efficacy in practice’.32 Nevertheless, while it questions 
the practical application of a principle of shared parenting, the report emphasises that ‘we 
would certainly wish to encourage it’. It goes on to suggest that the Government might 
consider setting up a pilot scheme to test the effect of such orders.33 
 Despite the circumspect attitude to shared parenting in the report, the references to it in the 
document have had an impact. Very quickly the press took up the debate34 and an international 
conference, chaired by Dame Margaret Booth, was arranged to examine the possibility of a 
‘presumption of shared parenting with the public law threshold of “good reasons”’.35 It 
appears, therefore, that shared parenting is now on the law reform agenda.36 
RE-VISITING THE PAST 
That the idea is being treated as new and that shared parenting is attracting serious 
consideration as a solution to the problem of parental conflict over contact is puzzling. In 
effect, the proponents of shared parenting have resurrected the old debates over joint custody 
                                                          
 25 H. Rhoades notes that the majority of calls for legislative change in Australia came from fathers’ groups and 
references, inter alia, M. Kaye and J. Tolmie, ‘Fathers’ Rights Groups in Australia’ (1999) 12 Australian Journal 
of Family Law 19, at p 33; R. Graycar, ‘Law Reform by Frozen Chook: family law reform for the new 
millennium?’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 737 (H. Rhoades, op cit, nn 16 and 20).  
 26 Op cit, n 24, at para 6. 
 27 Ibid, appendix 3, at paras 1 and 5. 
 28 Ibid, appendix 3, at paras 3 and 8. 
 29 Ibid, preface, at para 9. 
 30 Ibid, appendix 3, at para 13. 
 31 Ibid, appendix 3, at para 14. 
 32 Ibid, appendix 3, at para 14. 
 33 Ibid, appendix 3, at para 16. 
 34 See M. Driscoll, ‘After the split, the marrying of minds’ (2002) The Sunday Times, February 17, and M. Freely, 
‘Children First’ (2002) The Guardian, March 27. 
 35 A. Sealy, ‘A Different Framework for Contact’ [2002] Fam Law 88. 
 36 Calls for increased use of shared parenting are likely to intensify when the details of the new child support 
scheme become more widely known. The Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2002, amending the 
Child Support Act 1991, increases the possibility of a reduction in payments for non-resident parents (NRPs) 
where staying contact occurs. See further, N. Wikeley, ‘Child Support – The New Formula, Part 1’ [2000] Fam 
Law 820, at p 822. 
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that took place during the 1980s. At that time, much was made of the developments in the USA 
where joint custody or shared residence orders were in vogue as the preferred answer to the 
conflict resulting from a win–lose situation between the separating parents. Indeed, the Report 
of the Matrimonial Causes Procedure Committee in 1985 had advocated joint legal custody as 
a solution for England and Wales but had warned that it should not be mandatory.37 The 1986 
Report of the Law Commission found that the case for a legal presumption in favour of joint 
custody had not been made out.38 The Commission considered both joint legal custody and 
joint physical custody and concluded that the former would be potentially undesirable in 
practice,39 while the latter would be potentially contrary to the interests of both mothers and 
children.40 The Law Commission, in common with many feminist commentators, was 
concerned that imposed joint custody could detrimentally alter power balances and could 
increase the likelihood of litigation. There are cases, it said, where the needs of custodial 
parents and children to feel free from any threat of interference ‘must be put before the 
symbolic advantages of joint custody’.41 And, it commented, in the absence of genuine shared 
care, joint custody would be largely symbolic.42 In its 1988 report,43 the Law Commission 
showed no greater enthusiasm for joint custody and it clearly did not favour the introduction 
into the law of any presumptions. Instead, it opted for a flexible menu of orders and explicitly 
rejected the idea that the court should specify how the child’s time should be divided.44  
 The absence of a presumption of joint custody in the Children Act 1989 is, then, the result of 
considerable debate over a period of time. The scheme of parental responsibility, section 8 
orders and the ‘no order’ principle was devised after careful deliberation and there were cogent 
reasons for the decision not to introduce a shared parenting presumption. Yet there is a myth 
emerging to the effect that the omission of a shared parenting provision was an error or was 
inadvertent. The President of the Family Division is reported as saying that the shared 
parenting philosophy underpinning the Children Act 1989 was ‘thought out, but not sorted 
out’45 and Cameron likewise commented: ‘We just took it [the new thinking of the Children 
Act] on board, we didn’t actually think through what we were trying to do’.46  
 This is not to deny that disagreements persisted after the passage of the Children Act 1989. 
While some commentators looked on the parental responsibility provisions with a somewhat 
cynical eye, others saw in them an unsuccessful attempt to introduce equality between parents. 
Edwards and Halpern fell into the former category. They maintained that the Children Act 
1989, along with the Child Support Act 1991 and the Criminal Justice Act 1991, included 
provisions designed as mechanisms to restructure thinking on parental responsibility so as to 
legitimate a reduction in state support for members of the family.47 In contrast, Bainham, for 
example, contended that the Children Act 1989 was intended to promote dual parenting but had 
failed to do so; it promotes neither co-operative decision making nor ‘time-sharing’, he said.48 
More recently, the Equal Parenting Council produced a ‘Shared Residence Guide’, which 
argues that shared custody was Parliament’s intention behind the Children Act 1989. It goes on 
to give reasons for supporting such a legal principle, referring to US practice and, notably, to 
                                                          
 37 (HMSO, 1985), at para 4.131, which proposed that ‘prominence’ should be given to joint custody to ‘reinforce 
the idea of continuing joint parental responsibility’. The report did not recommend a presumption because it 
would ‘detract from the overriding principle’ of the welfare of the child (at para 4.132).  
  38 Op cit, n 2, at para 4.46. 
 39 Ibid, at paras 4.40–4.41. 
 40 Ibid, at para 4.45. 
 41 Ibid, at para 4.43. 
 42 Ibid, at paras 4.40 and 4.43. 
 43 Op cit, n 4. 
 44 Ibid, at para 4.10. 
 45 Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P, quoted by M. Driscoll, op cit, n 34. 
 46 Conference Report, op cit, n 22, at p 15. 
 47 S. Edwards and A. Halpern, ‘Parental Responsibility: An Instrument of Social Policy’ [1992] Fam Law 113. 
 48 Op cit, n 19, at pp 211–212. 
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the endorsement by George W. Bush, as Governor of Texas, of ‘joint managing 
conservatorship’.49  
 Whatever the intention of members of the legislature, it has become apparent over the last 
decade that parents – particularly fathers who do not have their children living with them – 
have come to see the current legal framework as no more helpful to their situation than the old. 
They argue that parental responsibility is a sham, that courts will not properly consider shared 
residence and that by failing to enforce orders, they allow recalcitrant mothers to obstruct 
contact. Specifically, the legal concept of parental responsibility is seen as conferring on many 
fathers what is merely a dubious symbolic affirmation of their parenting, since they do not have 
what they consider to be enough involvement with their children. 
PROFESSIONAL ATTITUDES 
In some respects this perception is surprising in that courts, in the 1990s, developed what – 
until Thorpe LJ re-named it an assumption – was clearly a presumption in favour of contact.50 
Several cases reiterated that it was almost always in a child’s interests to have contact with 
both parents. Notions of the implacably hostile mother and something akin to ‘parental 
alienation syndrome’ were developed in the course of judgments revealing an increasingly 
tough line on ‘recalcitrant’ parents. Courts were also showing greater willingness to employ 
coercive measures to enforce orders as, for example, in A v N (Committal: Refusal of 
Contact).51 It is only very recently that judicial attitudes have begun to change and, moreover, 
these changes are limited in scope. In cases of domestic violence, proof of violence (the risk is 
not sufficient)52 may offset the assumption, but it does not necessarily do so. Nor, as Re L 
makes clear, does it create a presumption against contact.53 And while Thorpe LJ in Re L 
sought to stress that other factors might also offset the assumption, there are as yet no reported 
decisions affirming his view. 
 Solicitors and mediators too have tended to exhibit a strong preference for the dual-parent 
post-separation family. Family solicitors have been trained to promote responsible parenting, 
co-operation and contact and they have become skilled at doing so. They talk in terms of 
‘responsibilities’ and ‘involvement’ and stress the continuing nature of parental responsibility 
for both mothers and fathers.54 They also act together to encourage their clients to make an 
agreement – a development that ‘creates an impression of solicitors acting in concert in the 
face of one (or two) difficult parents’.55 And they vigorously promote contact: ‘The only time I 
lay down the law and I’m heavy handed is if I’ve got a mother who’s not allowing contact ... I 
try to beat everybody into submission’.56 They are putting across a message, then, that is 
consistent with the promotion of dual parenting: only those parents who co-operate with the 
other parent and agree contact are taking the sensible approach to divorce.57  
 These ideas about parental responsibility and the benefits of contact in this context are 
shared by divorce court welfare officers (now children and family reporters).58 Their practice 
guidelines give priority to encouraging an agreed outcome and there would seem to be an 
                                                          
 49 www.equalparentingcouncil.org/makingcontactwork.htm. 
 50 Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence), op cit, n 20, at p 367G. 
 51 [1997] 1 FLR 533. 
 52 See F. Kaganas, ‘Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re V (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re M (Contact: 
Domestic Violence); Re H (Contact: Domestic Violence) – Contact and domestic violence’ [2000] CFLQ 311. 
 53 Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re V (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re M (Contact: Domestic Violence); 
Re H (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2000] 2 FLR 334. 
 54 C. Piper, ‘How do you define a family lawyer?’ (1999) 19(1) Legal Studies 93. 
 55 R. Bailey-Harris et al, op cit, n 11. 
 56 B. Neale and C. Smart, ‘“Good” and “Bad” Lawyers? Struggling in the Shadow of the Law’ (1997) 19(4) Journal 
of Social Welfare and Family Law 377, at p 392. 
 57 M. King, ‘“Being Sensible”, Images and Practices of the New Family Lawyer’ (1999) 28(2) Journal of Social 
Policy 249.  
 58 See C. Piper, ‘The wishes and feelings of the child’, in S. Day Sclater and C. Piper (eds), Undercurrents of 
Divorce (Ashgate, 1999), at pp 88–92.  
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unquestioning belief among some in the good of contact.59 For example, a recent letter to 
Family Law from a team manager discusses the situation ‘where one parent is implacably 
hostile to contact and the child is suffering’. The author goes on to add ‘when wouldn’t the 
child suffer?’, a rhetorical assertion indicating an unquestioning assumption that children 
always suffer in these circumstances.60 The court welfare officers (CWOs) in Sawyer’s study61 
were a little more equivocal. They were ‘committed to the value of children having contact 
with both parents but believed that other factors could outweigh that presumption’.62 However, 
their reservations did not, it seems, affect their practices; even in cases where they thought 
contact inappropriate, they recommended it. They did so because they perceived a strong 
expectation of contact at all costs on the part of the courts. Interviewees thought that the courts 
put undue emphasis on the advantages of contact and ignored its possible detrimental aspects. 
But they did not question the appropriateness of operating a general presumption in favour of 
contact. Where this faith in the advisability of contact in the general run of cases stems from is 
obscure. Interviewees asserted that their recommendations were based on research, yet they 
were unable to specify which research they relied on. Bailey Harris et al report similar findings 
of conviction without any obvious basis. They observe that the tendency is for all the 
professionals to support one another in a ‘circular’ manner: ‘Contact is presumed to be for the 
good of the child, but often no evidence is produced to demonstrate this’.63 
 There is, then, extensive evidence that all professionals involved with separating families 
sing from the same song sheet about the benefits of contact, parental co-operation and 
communication.64 In that sense the scheme of parental responsibility, section 8 orders and the 
hurdle to the making of orders created by section 1(5) (the so-called no-order presumption) has 
influenced attitudes – certainly those of professionals and possibly those of the parents who are 
persuaded not to oppose contact.65  
A 70/30 PRESUMPTION 
In this context, a presumption or assumption, particularly one that does not entail equal 
division of time, does not seem to be quite so radical. For example, the 70/30 split advocated 
by Cameron – effected, perhaps, by weekend contact each week66 – might appear to reflect a 
relatively common arrangement and so seem unobjectionable.67 However, we argue, the 
introduction of a presumption would, in fact, be fraught with both practical and doctrinal 
difficulty.  
 Parents who are able to co-operate have little need of a presumption. The proponents of 
shared parenting see its utility, rather, in the situation where non-resident parents face 
opposition from caregiving parents. In that situation a statutory presumption, whether for a 
70/30 split or not, could be used by fathers and professionals to set the tone for negotiation and 
                                                          
 59 National Standards for Probation Service Family Court Welfare Work (HMSO, 1995), at p 2.  
 60 A. Critchley, ‘When Will I See My Dad’ [2002] Fam Law 319, at p 320. 
 61 C. Sawyer, ‘An Inside Story. Ascertaining the Child’s Wishes and Feelings’ [2000] Fam Law 170. 
 62 Ibid, at p 172. 
 63 Op cit, n 11, at p 35. 
 64 See, also, C. Piper and S. Day Sclater, ‘Changing Divorce’, in S. Day Sclater and C. Piper (eds), Undercurrents 
of Divorce (Ashgate, 1999).  
 65 J. Dewar, reporting on his research into the new Australian law, observed that the further parties were from the 
trial process, the greater the impact of the law. Solicitors reported ‘quite a few changes to practice’, whereas 
barristers and judges reported comparatively few, with the same questions being resolved in the same way 
(J. Dewar, Reducing Discretion in Family Law, Family Law Research Unit, Working Paper Series, Working 
Paper No 1 (Griffith University, 1997), at pp 21–22). 
 66 Cameron himself refers to ‘Something like that, alternate weekends, half the holidays in a 70/30 split’ 
(Conference Report, op cit, n 22, at p 16).  
 67 P. Henman and K. Mitchell, accounting presumably for shorter holidays than Cameron, assume an 80/20% split, 
based on ‘anecdotal evidence that the aforementioned pattern of contact – of half the school holidays and every 
second weekend – is a common arrangement between separated parents in Australia’ (P. Henman and 
K. Mitchell, ‘Estimating the Cost of Contact for Non-resident Parents: a Budget Standards Approach’ (2001) 
30(3) Journal of Social Policy 495, at p 502). 
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so to put pressure on mothers in the same way that they use the court-operated 
presumption/assumption at present. Certainly the Australian research quoted above showed 
that there had been ‘a shift in the balance of bargaining power between parties’ in favour of the 
non-residential parent.68 This may promote agreement and avoid litigation in some cases but 
may at the same time carry the risk of jeopardising the interests of mothers and children.69  
 Many mothers might have very good reasons for opposing shared parenting and these may 
never come to light or may be minimised in the push for a consent order. Buchanan and Hunt, 
for example, found that, in their sample, at least one parent reported domestic violence, 
including harassment and intimidation in 78% of cases and, in 56%, there were reports of 
physical violence. The incidents referred to were rarely minor and in almost two-thirds of cases 
the violence and fear were present after separation.70 By the time of the court proceedings, 
sometimes years after separation, the fear/violence persisted in half of the cases but only 
one-quarter of those interviewed cited violence as an issue in the case. So, even if conduct such 
as domestic violence might be allowed in law to rebut the proposed presumption, evidence of 
this may not, in practice, come before the court.  
 In any event, the likelihood that some mothers who oppose contact will be made to agree to 
it does not necessarily support the claims of the proponents of a presumption of shared 
parenting that it will be a solution to the problem of conflict over contact. As Making Contact 
Work71 points out, it is doubtful that the existence of a presumption will prevent acrimonious 
disagreement between parents who cannot co-operate. 
 First, it is doubtful whether it will significantly reduce litigation. Dewar, for example, 
contends that there is ‘no hard evidence’ that firmer rules reducing discretion make it easier to 
reach agreements.72 The Australian statistics for contact applications since the 1996 
amendments seem to bear this out. While there is not a presumption of shared care in the 
Australian legislation, the perception that the legislation created new ‘rights’ encouraged 
parents to seek court orders, ‘with applications to enforce contact orders more than doubling 
since 1996’.73 Dewar and Parker remark on this increase in litigation and suggest that the new 
provisions have ‘created opportunities for contact parents to harass and control residence 
parents through litigation’.74 Certainly, research in the UK shows that ‘there has been a 
remarkable rise both in the number of orders and the number of “disposals” in respect of 
private law applications under the Children Act’.75 This would suggest that the existing 
presumption or assumption in favour of contact has done nothing to stem the tide of litigation 
and there is no reason to suppose that a statutory presumption of shared parenting will prove 
more effective in doing so. Mothers who are strongly opposed to any contact at all or who may 
wish to resist a statutorily mandated split will seek to rebut the presumption in much the same 
way as they do now.76 
 Secondly, whatever arrangement is embodied in a court order, child care arrangements are 
unlikely to work or to take place in a conflict-free context, unless the parents espouse this as a 
goal and are willing and able to achieve it. A parent might be pressured into agreeing to shared 
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parenting but may resist implementing the arrangement. There is nothing to indicate that 
changing the nature of the presumption as proposed will increase compliance. Certainly the 
increased litigation in Australia following the 1996 amendments had in turn been followed by 
increased dissatisfaction and litigation about enforcement,77 with further amendments passed in 
2000 to broaden the court’s compliance powers, notably by a requirement to attend a parent 
education programme, and the ability to make an order for compensation (for contact forgone), 
in addition to the existing penal sanctions.  
 The report to the Lord Chancellor in the UK recommends similar new measures to 
encourage compliance as well as various means of enforcing orders.78 While punitive measures 
such as fines, imprisonment of mothers or transfer of residence are still regarded as a sanction 
of last resort for those obstructing contact,79 the report’s recommendations to expand the scope 
of the court’s powers envisage a battery of other ‘persuasive’ measures. They include powers 
to refer defaulting parents to information meetings, meetings with counsellors, parenting 
programmes/classes, psychiatrists or psychologists. Courts should also, the document suggests, 
be able to place parents on probation or impose community service orders. The effect that these 
reforms might have in highly conflicted, no-contact cases (where domestic violence is not 
involved) is unknown, although research is being seen as supportive of the claim that parent 
education works for this group of parents. To quote a recent newspaper article: ‘[T]here is 
strong evidence that a well conceived, pre-emptive, multi-exit system cuts down the number of 
people who end up in court … The key ingredient in a pre-emptive system is parent support 
and education’.80 However, Eekelaar issues a timely warning: ‘[L]et there be no mistake: the 
recommendations of the report [Making Contact Work] signal a significant increase in legal 
coercion over family arrangements’.81 This expansion of the courts’ repertoire has potentially 
damaging consequences for resident mothers. According to Rhoades, enforcement proceedings, 
or the threat of them, are used by abusive men to control and harass carers,82 and for mothers 
who are not open to persuasion or, perhaps, intimidation, there is the prospect of imprisonment, 
something the report acknowledges is not self-evidently in the best interests of the children 
concerned. A statutory presumption of shared parenting has, arguably, the potential for an 
increase in the use of such measures. There will be more court orders for contact and, so, more 
mothers will be exposed to the risk of imprisonment for defying such orders.  
THE LIMITS OF LAW 
Short of imposing punitive sanctions, the law, as Thorpe LJ observed in Re L,83 can do little to 
resolve intractable disputes over children. It can neither engender harmony nor ensure that 
children have continuing relationships – and in particular beneficial relationships – with 
non-resident parents. It is not designed to and so cannot address the profound emotional forces 
that drive the parties. To quote Eekelaar again: ‘[I]t is important not to jump from the fact that 
an outcome is optimally desirable to the conclusion that it should, therefore, be legally 
enforceable’.84 Such a jump ignores not only the quality of the child’s relationships with her 
parents but also the complexity of parental motivations in seeking or refusing contact.  
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 In Rhoades’ study, the most common reason for conflict was the resident parent’s concern 
about the other parent’s parenting capacities. Objections centred on factors such as inadequate 
supervision, substance abuse, mental health problems, domestic violence and child abuse.85 
Buchanan and Hunt86 also found that child protection concerns were present in a relatively high 
proportion of cases, with parents voicing worries about substance abuse, mental illness and 
risks to the child. 
 Another recent study in the UK reveals similar findings. In this study, seeking to explore the 
dynamics of protracted contact disputes,87 mothers and fathers who had been involved in a 
dispute for at least one year were interviewed with a view to gaining some understanding of 
their perceptions of the dispute. The mothers interviewed framed their resistance to contact in 
terms of their children’s welfare. Some of them questioned the father’s commitment or 
capacity to be a good parent. A few resisted contact because for them it signified the 
prolonging of negative relationships. Several recounted incidents of violence on the part of 
their former partners and maintained that contact would expose their children to risk.  
 In contrast, those fathers who admitted to violence or to being ‘aggressive’ still saw 
themselves as good parents. Some fathers cast doubt on their former partners’ parenting 
capacities and maintained that their presence in the children’s lives was necessary to counter 
maternal failings. Some framed mothers’ opposition to contact as evidence of instability or 
unreasonableness and some accused mothers of turning their children against them.  
 Both mothers and fathers saw themselves as good parents. The interviewees all believed 
themselves to be acting in their children’s best interests and perceived their continued 
engagement in the contest over contact as necessary to safeguard those interests. The fact that 
many of them, mothers and fathers, had been to court and had failed to get the outcomes they 
sought did not deter them from persevering with the conflict. They simply dismissed the law as 
unfair, gender biased and damaging to their children’s best interests. For them, the battle had to 
go on irrespective of what the law declared; fighting on was part of their duty to be a ‘good 
parent’.  
 Not only is the law ill-equipped to produce conflict-free relationships in the face of the 
profoundly-held convictions of parents who believe that what they are doing is right, it is also 
ill-equipped to inspire in unwilling parents a sense of the responsibility endorsed by the law. 
The law, as has often been noted, cannot address the problem that many non-resident parents 
either do not seek contact at all or fail to exercise it once it has been ordered or agreed. It has 
been said that such non-resident parents are not labelled as ‘implacably irresponsible’88 and 
‘are permitted a capacity for ambivalence in relation to their parenting that is not equally 
available to the primary caregiver’.89 It does not appear to be envisaged that the proposals for 
further sanctions against the contact-denying resident parent should also be applied to the 
contact-refusing non-resident parent.  
JOINT PARENTING? 
A shared parenting presumption is, then, unlikely to encourage those fathers who do not want 
contact to maintain relationships with their children. It might, however, enable some fathers 
who do want contact to view the law less negatively. At the same time, it may have the 
opposite effect on mothers and increase feelings of resentment and hostility: in the light of their 
childcare duties, both in the intact and separated family, they might regard the label of ‘shared 
parenting’ as downgrading their efforts.90  
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 On the one hand, some research shows an increase in parenting by fathers91 and there is an 
assumption on the part of professionals that parental decision making in the intact family is 
joint.92 On the other hand, parenting for fathers, whether in intact families or separated, means 
something different than it does for mothers. The research of Maclean and Eekelaar, for 
example, found ‘little evidence of widespread “joint” parenting or joint decision making either 
while the parents were living together or afterwards’.93 Fathers tend not to take on 
responsibility for the ‘burden of administering the endless minutiae of family life’,94 and seem 
to focus more of their parenting on interaction and play than on physical care or discipline.95 
They typically spend less time with children and are rarely involved in responsibility for 
organising child care, decision making and being available for sick children.96 The extent to 
which fathers maintain contact with their children after separation is variable and this is not 
attributable solely to obstructive mothers; Maclean and Eekelaar97 found that the age of the 
children and, in some cases, re-partnering by either the mother or the father affected contact. It 
is not only new family commitments that might reduce contact; there is also research about the 
existence of, and pressure to engage in, a ‘long hours’ work culture98 that highlights the 
difficulties facing fathers, whether separated or not, who do wish to be more involved. 
Certainly research in various jurisdictions has shown that children of intact, as well as 
separated, families wish to see their fathers more99 and that, even in dual earner families, 
housework and child care is still primarily ‘women’s work’.100 
 Smart, in her research, has drawn a distinction between the labour of ‘caring for’ children’s 
everyday needs and the more abstract concern embodied in the notion of ‘caring about’.101 The 
mothers in her study, while they accepted that their former partners ‘cared about’ their 
children, expressed ‘anger and bewilderment at a legal system that could give joint custody or 
unlimited access to a father who might “care about” but who had not done any of the “caring 
for”’.102 There is also evidence from mediation research that the process of constituting as joint 
what does not appear so to the two parents – to encourage the acceptance of shared parenting 
after separation – potentially increases feelings of injustice.103  
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 Where mediators used a technique of ‘equalising’ the contributions to child care of both 
parents, the main care-giving parent expressed a sense of grievance.104 In particular, if the 
reasons for the breakdown of the inter-parental relationship included the anger of the care-
giving parent at being unable to negotiate a more equitable division of child care duties, then 
such a strategy may heighten perceptions of unfairness and exacerbate conflict.105 
 Resentment and conflict may also be fuelled by the current trend to equate ‘care’ with 
‘contact’.106 The findings of the Australian enforcement study suggest that ‘there remains a 
wide divergence between contact and parenting, and that some men continue to opt for the 
former’.107 To designate what is essentially contact between many fathers and children as 
‘shared care’ is unlikely to reflect the realities of the arrangements or, therefore, to 
acknowledge the greater responsibilities of mothers. 
PRESUMPTIONS AND THE WELFARE PRINCIPLE 
While a shared parenting presumption may be seen as prejudicial by mothers, it is justified by 
its proponents in terms of children’s best interests. However, such a presumption would tend to 
obscure the particularity of the individual child’s situation. It would also largely discount child 
welfare knowledge that denies or qualifies the advantages of shared parenting. There is a 
widely held view that children usually benefit from the active involvement of both parents after 
divorce, but there is also research that concludes that these benefits might be limited or absent 
in certain circumstances. Bridge maintains, for example, that a child’s welfare is not promoted 
if he ‘feels obliged to divide and compartmentalise his life in a stressful way’.108 Similarly, a 
recent comparative review of joint custody has concluded that ‘keeping the “child’s family” 
together can sometimes actually turn out to be a serious risk for the welfare of the child’ 
because of the ‘real danger of serious parental conflict’.109 Furthermore, given that the current 
pressure for shared parenting encompasses pressure for a greater quantity of contact time, it is 
also salient to mention literature challenging the assumption that contact is in itself (barring 
domestic violence) generally beneficial. Recent research suggests that: ‘It is at least possible 
that the absence of contact could often have no adverse effects and that it [contact] could be 
detrimental to children’.110 Research also suggests that the nature of the contact may be more 
important for the child’s well-being than frequency: ‘Fathers who are able to have a nurturing 
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and monitoring role have a positive impact on their children in a variety of ways … Those 
fathers whose participation is confined to outings and having fun will, then, have little 
influence on their children’s adjustment’.111  
 It is, then, by no means self-evident that shared parenting and, in particular, something like a 
70/30 arrangement, can be assumed to be in line with a consensus within child welfare 
knowledge. On the contrary, a general rule in the form of a presumption in favour of shared 
parenting would entrench in the law even further what is already a selective and simplified 
version of welfare.112 
 There are also doctrinal obstacles to a presumption of shared parenting stemming from the 
existence of the paramountcy principle. If it is accepted that there is no unequivocal evidence 
that shared parenting is in the best interests of children generally, it is hard to see how a 
presumption would be reconcilable with the notion of paramountcy: a blanket presumption 
could not take account of the particular child’s welfare adequately. Whether a presumption 
would be equal to the task of safeguarding children’s well-being has been doubted by, for 
example, a Canadian government adviser and sometime judge. He stresses the need for 
‘discretion and creativity’ in this area.113 Indeed, this was the basis of the rejection by the 
Booth Committee of a joint custody presumption in 1985: ‘It must remain a question for the 
court, in the exercise of its unfettered discretion, to decide in each case what order would best 
serve the child’s interest’.114 Dewar goes so far as to suggest that a shift away from discretion 
towards a rule-based approach constitutes a move away from welfare; it can be characterised, 
he says, as a shift towards conceptualising family law as a ‘means of giving effect to rights 
irrespective of consequences, or to specific a priori juridical models of family relations, rather 
than being concerned to search for the most beneficial or welfare-maximising outcome’.115 This 
shift, he suggests, can be seen as much as a response to fathers’ claims for rights as it is the 
result of concern for children.116 
 Nor would a presumption, and especially one framed in terms of fixed proportions, leave 
room for proper consideration of children’s wishes and feelings. A regional manager of 
CAFCASS has reported that, already, children who do not want to see the non-resident parent 
may have to ‘work really hard’ to be heard,117 a situation which the proposed presumption 
would hardly ameliorate. In the eyes of those commentators currently suggesting that children 
are treated as objects in the divorce process and arguing for their greater involvement, such a 
step might, then, be seen as positively detrimental.  
 On the other hand, the importance of the child’s view has been explicitly acknowledged by 
the European Court of Human Rights. In a recent case it found a breach of the procedural rights 
inherent in Article 8 where the 5-year-old child had not been asked directly by the reporting 
psychologist about her relationship with her father.118 Furthermore, courts in the UK have 
exhibited reluctance to impose orders on older children against their wishes.  
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 In a recent reported decision,119 the Family Division refused to order the contact sought by a 
father of three adolescents aged 12, 14 and 16. The court made no order in respect of the eldest 
and in respect of the other two, any contact had to be subject to the agreement of the young 
person concerned and contact was ordered in terms that reflected their wishes. The judge, 
referring to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950 (European Convention) and applying the Children Act 1989 welfare checklist, 
considered it his duty to take cognisance of the children’s wishes, taking into account their ages 
and understanding: ‘[C]hildren of this age … are entitled to have respect for their views … If 
young people are to be brought up to respect the law, then it seems to me that the law must 
respect them and their wishes, even to the extent of allowing them … to make mistakes’.120 
 The judge was also loath to make an order which would not be enforced by the father if it 
were disobeyed; orders should not be made in the expectation that they would not be obeyed, 
he said. In any case, how the courts would enforce a contact order resisted by the child is 
difficult to imagine.121 
 It appears likely that UK judges would find a presumption of any kind difficult to apply 
under the Children Act 1989 and would also see it as incompatible with the Human Rights Act 
1998. Recent reported decisions reveal a clear trend in the courts to move away from talk of 
presumptions in children cases. In the case of Payne v Payne [2001] EWCA Civ 166,122 
Thorpe LJ made his misgivings clear: ‘I do not think that such concepts of presumption and 
burden of proof have any place in Children Act 1989 litigation where the judge exercises a 
function that is partly inquisitorial’.123 He further observed that to create a presumption in 
favour of one parent would present a risk to the other parent’s right to private and family life in 
terms of Article 8 of the European Convention as well as a right to a fair trial under 
Article 6.124 In addition, European jurisprudence made it plain that decisions should be made in 
accordance with the paramountcy principle125 and that this should be the context in which the 
balancing exercise weighing the parties’ rights should be undertaken.126 This interpretation of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 suggests that the court will always be obliged to consider the 
interests of all those concerned, weigh them in the balance and reach a conclusion that best 
protects the child’s welfare. A blanket presumption would be inconsistent with this approach. 
The most the reformers could hope for would be the introduction into the law of an 
‘assumption’ that shared parenting is in children’s best interests. 
CONCLUSION 
It is not our purpose to argue that active, co-operative and conflict-free participation by both 
mothers and fathers in parenting their children is not desirable; it probably is. However, it is 
our contention that the introduction of a presumption in favour of shared parenting would not 
achieve this aim and might be detrimental. The proposals for defined ‘time-shares’ for parents 
post-separation are new in their specificity of contact/residence shares and in their entry into 
policy debate,127 but their ‘newness’ should not blind us to the fact that the research done and 
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the arguments made in the 1980s before the Children Act 1989 was finalised still have 
relevance. It is not a question of re-visiting ‘old’ feminist arguments but of ensuring that the 
current policy debate takes place with explicit reference to arguments that were accepted and 
acceptable in the recent past. By ignoring that context, there is the risk of instituting changes 
which lead to increased costs, financial and emotional.  
 There is, however, another context that the present emerging debate is in danger of ignoring 
and that is the research which has been undertaken in the last decade about family transitions. 
These are increasingly providing support for different, and infinitely more complex, ideas 
about ‘the separated family’. Smart and Wade’s research reveals at least four different 
categories of families which are not ‘intact’ nuclear families, and reveals children with both a 
capacity to cope positively with multiple change and a set of concerns that do not focus on the 
separation of their parents per se.128 As Pryor and Rodgers comment: ‘Because the present rate 
of change in family structures is high, we cannot, and indeed must not, assume that most 
children spend their childhood in one house with two biological parents and their biological 
siblings’.129 And yet the debate about shared parenting assumes precisely that, at least in 
relation to the situation prior to parental separation. In fact there may, in contrast, be various 
half-siblings, more than one step-parent, several houses and homosexual as well as 
heterosexual re-partnering.130 A policy that may seem appropriate for the simplified image of 
pre-separation and post-separation families may not be so when the complexity of the forms 
these families take is better understood.  
 Furthermore, the doctrinal obstacles, particularly the tenaciousness of the paramountcy 
principle in all thinking about children cases, are likely to be considerable. But more 
significantly, the difficulty of showing any practical benefits could be as great. There is no 
evidence that non-resident fathers who do not want or seek contact will be imbued with a new 
sense of responsibility as a result of a change in the law. Nor is there any evidence that the goal 
of reducing conflict or even litigation would be met. While a presumption might change the 
balance of power in negotiations in some cases, it may also strengthen the hand of a 
non-resident parent wishing to control or harass the other parent. Apart from this, it remains the 
case that the law cannot change behaviour, and playing yet again with the symbols will not 
make bitterly conflicted parents into a harmonious post-separation ‘family’. 
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